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Abstract:  We  argue  that  some  but  not  all  superstitions  can  persist  when  learning  is 
rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by 
the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a 
way  of  deciding  whether  an  accusation  was  true,  so  it  seems  to  have  relied  on  the 
superstition that the guilty are more likely to drown than the innocent. If people can be 
easily persuaded to hold this superstitious belief, why not the superstitious belief that the 
guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We argue that the former can persist but the latter 
cannot by giving a partial characterization of the outcomes that arise as the limit of steady 
states with rational learning as players become more patient. These “subgame-confirmed 
Nash equilibria” have self-confirming beliefs at information sets reachable by a single 
deviation. According to this theory a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps 
off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,” is more likely to 
persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off of the equilibrium 
path. 
                                                 
1 We thank Douglas Bernheim, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at MIT, Yale, University of 
Texas Austin, Hong Kong University, University of Tokyo, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and 
Stanford for helpful comments.    1 
1. Introduction 
  By  a  superstition  we  mean  a  belief  which  is  objectively  false.  When  can  a 
superstition persist in the face of rational learning? Our basic insight is that superstitions 
concerning events that are off of the equilibrium path are more likely to persist than those 
that are not. Intuitively, if play converges to a steady state, we expect the players to learn 
(at least) the path of play.  However, this does not rule out false beliefs about play off of 
the equilibrium path, and it does not even imply that the steady states must be Nash 
equilibria, because Nash equilibrium corresponds to a situation where players know not 
only the equilibrium path but also the consequences of unilateral deviations. Rational but 
very impatient learners will only play “greedy” strategies that maximize current payoff, 
so steady states with impatient rational learners can exhibit a wide range of false beliefs. 
Rational and patient learners “experiment” with other strategies. This experimentation 
reduces  the  set  of  durable  superstitions.  The  question  then  is  just  how  much 
experimentation rational learners will do, and how much this will restrict the possible off-
path beliefs. 
To carry out the analysis, we adopt the overlapping-generations model of our 
[1993b] paper, and consider the limit of the steady states of this learning model, as first 
the length of life becomes infinite, and then the discount factor approaches one; we call 
these the “patiently stable states.”  Past work has shown that non-Nash equilibria can be 
steady  states  if  learners  are  impatient,  but  that  any  patiently  stable  state  must  be 
equivalent  to  a  Nash  equilibrium.  However,  past  results  did  not  give  a  sufficient 
condition  for  patient  stability,  which  leaves  open  the  issue  of  the  extent  to  which 
superstitions that arise in a Nash equilibrium are durable. We show that even patient 
players need not experiment enough to rule out all superstitions, and in particular false 
beliefs can survive about play that is more than one step off of the equilibrium path. This 
leads to our solution concept of “subgame-confirmed” equilibrium. Our central result is 
that this is a sufficient condition for patient stability.  
As an example of a superstition that survived for quite some time, consider the 
Code of Hammurabi. The second of Hammurabi’s laws is “If any one bring an accusation 
against a man, and the accused go to the river and leap into the river, if he sink in the 
river his accuser shall take possession of his house. But if the river prove that the accused   2 
is not guilty, and he escape unhurt, then he who had brought the accusation shall be put to 
death, while he who leaped into the river shall take possession of the house that had 
belonged to his accuser.” This law seems to be based on the superstition that the guilty 
are more likely to drown than the innocent. If people are this superstitious, why use such 
an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck 
dead by lightning, while the innocent will not be? If this is believed, it will be as effective 
at preventing crime as the Hammurabi mechanism, and it does not require witnesses or 
judges or any of the other complicated and costly elements of the Hammurabi code.  
To  understand  the  logic  behind  our  analysis,  suppose  that  players  are 
indoctrinated into a social norm as children – for example “if you commit a crime you 
will be struck by lightning” – and enter the world as young adults with a prior belief that 
it is very likely that the social norm is true. The players are patient, rational Bayesians, so 
when they are young they optimally decide to commit a few crimes to see what will 
happen. In the case of the lightning-strike norm, most young players will discover that the 
chances of being struck by lightning are independent of whether they commit crimes, and 
so go on to a life of crime, thereby undermining the norm. The Hammurabi case is more 
complex: the social norm is to not commit crimes and to only accuse the guilty.  If older 
people adhere to this norm, what happens? Young potential criminals commit crimes, are 
accused of crimes, and are punished, so they learn that crime does not pay, and as they 
grow older stop committing crimes. But what about the young accusers?  The critical fact 
is that the accusers only get to play the game after a crime takes place. As we have 
described  the  situation,  there  are  few  crimes,  hence  accusers  only  get  to  play 
infrequently.
2 Infrequent play reduces the value of experimentation, because there will 
likely be a long delay before the knowledge gained can be put to use. Our results suggest 
that even patient and rational young accusers will not experiment with false accusations, 
and so they will never learn that the river is as likely to punish the innocent as the guilty. 
In practice, there may be other sources of experimentation than the rational learning that 
is the focus of this paper, and one might expect that all actions will in fact have  a 
positive, albeit very small, probability. We examine the robustness of our findings to such 
forces.  Briefly,  the  robust  implication  of  our  theory  is  that  “two-steps-off-the  path 
                                                 
2 It is also possible, for example, that the accuser is the criminal, in which case the accuser may get to play 
frequently. We discuss this and related issues in after explaining our main results.   3 
superstitions” will be more durable than false beliefs either on or one step off of the path 
of play.  
2. The Hammurabi Games 
We  begin  by  giving  several  stylized  games  inspired  by  the  example  of  the 
Hammurabi  superstition.  These  games  are  not  intended  to  be  detailed  or  accurate 
representations  of  the  situation  contemplated  in  the  Code  of  Hammurabi.  They  are 
intended  rather  to  capture  the  basic  idea  of  superstitions  that  might  or  might  not  be 
located on the equilibrium path. Later we discuss how these examples and our results 
may help us to understand the actual Code of Hammurabi and other similar types of 
superstitions. 
Example 2.1: The Hammurabi Game 
Our version of the “Hammurabi game” has two players, a suspect and an accuser. 
The suspect, player 1, moves first and may either exit or commit a crime. If the suspect 
exits the game ends. If the suspect chooses crime, the accuser, player 2, gets to move, 
and may either tell the truth or lie. 
  Both players get 0 if there is exit. If a crime is committed, and the accuser tells 
the truth, the suspect is thrown in the river, resulting in the suspect being punished with 
probability ￿ and the accuser with probability ￿ ￿ ￿ . If the accuser lies a falsely accused 
third party not explicitly represented in the game is thrown in the river and the accuser is 
punished with probability 1 p - .  
If the crime is committed the payoffs depend on whether the accuser tells the 
truth and whether he is punished. 
 
  Accuser not punished  Accuser punished 
truth  1 ,0 B P -   1, B P -  
lie  1 2 , B B   1 2 , B B P -  
 
Here  ￿ ￿  is the benefit of the crime to the suspect,  ￿ ￿  is the benefit of a false accusation 
to  the  accuser  and  the  cost  of  punishment  P   is  the  same  for  both.  We  assume  that 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  so that the true probability of drowning is sufficient to deter crime, and that   4 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , so that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . This implies that an accuser who knows how 
often guilty people drown (p) and believes that innocents never drown will prefer to 
accuse the guilty. Note that as long as the true probability that the accused drowns is 
independent  of  guilt,  it  is  in  fact  optimal  for  the  accuser  to  lie.  Note  also  that  our 
restrictions on the parameters are consistent with the idea that P  is large, i.e. the players 
really dislike drowning. 
  The game is illustrated in the extensive form below. 
 
 
 
Example 2.2: The Hammurabi Game Without a River 
In the Hammurabi game without a river is similar to the Hammurabi game, but 
there is no river. The suspect is always punished if the accuser tells the truth, and the 
accuser is never punished.  
Example 2.3: The Lightning Game 
1 2
N
N
crime
truth
lie
(0,0) (B1-P,0)
(B1,-P)
(B1,B2)
(B1,B2-P)
1-p
p
p
1-p
exit
1 2 crime
truth
lie
(0,0)
(B1-P,0)
(B1,B2)
exit  5 
In  the  lightning  game  there  is  no  accuser,  and  the  suspect  is  punished  with 
probability q, regardless of whether a crime is committed or what the accuser does. Here 
we assume that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  
  Each  of  these  three  games  has  a  strategy  profile  where  crimes  are  always 
committed,  and  a  profile  in  which  there  is  no  crime.  The  no-crime  profile  in  the 
Hammurabi game is for the accuser to tell the truth, because he believes that if he lies he 
will be punished with probability 1. In the Hammurabi game without a river, no crime 
occurs when the accuser tells the truth; this is weakly optimal for the accuser because he 
is indifferent. In the lightning game, crime is deterred if everyone believes that if they 
commit a crime they will be punished with probability 1, and that if they exit they will be 
punished with probability q. Our results will imply that only the Hammurabi game with a 
river has a patiently stable state with no crime. 
3. Simple Games 
This paper focuses on a special class of games where there is a straightforward 
sufficient condition for patient stability. A simple game is a game of perfect information 
(each  information  set  is  a  singleton  node)  in  which  each  player  has  at  most  one 
information set on each path through the tree. He may have more than one information 
set, but once he has moved, he never gets to move again. The Hammurabi game with and 
without a river and the lightning game are simple games.  
   To begin we specify some notation. There are  ￿ ￿ ￿  players in the game, where 
player  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is nature. The game tree ￿  with nodes ￿ ￿ ￿  is finite. The terminal 
nodes are ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Nodes are partially ordered by precedence, so if ￿  follows  ￿ ￿  we 
write  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Since information sets are singleton nodes, we also use  ￿  to denote the 
information sets. Information sets where player ￿ has the move are denoted by  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
while  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  are the information sets for other players (or nature). The feasible 
1
N
N
exit
crime
-P
0
B1-P
B1
1-q
q
q
1-q  6 
actions  at  information  sets  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   are  denoted  ￿￿ ￿￿ .  The  initial  information  set  is 
denoted by  ￿ ￿ ￿ . A pure strategy for player ￿,  ￿ ￿ , is an action at each information set 
in  ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ;  ￿ ￿  is the set of all such strategies. We let  ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote a 
pure  strategy  profile  for  all  players  including  nature,  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Each 
strategy profile determines a terminal node  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We suppose that all players know 
the structure of the extensive form – that is, the game tree  ￿  and action sets  ￿￿ ￿￿ . 
Hence, each player knows the space ￿  of strategy profiles and can compute the function 
￿ . Each player ￿ receives a payoff in the stage game that depends on the terminal node. 
Player  ￿ ￿ ￿   payoff  function  is  denoted  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿.  We  let 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the largest difference in utility levels. 
Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the space of probability distributions over a set. Then a mixed 
strategy profile is  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ . In addition to mixed strategies, we define behavior 
strategies.  A  behavior  strategy  for  player  ￿,  ￿ ￿ ,  assigns  information  sets  in  ￿ ￿   a 
probability distribution over feasible actions,  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;  ￿ ￿  is the set of all such 
strategies.  For a fixed  ￿ ￿ , the marginal probability of a node  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  depends on the 
behavior strategies of the other players and is denoted ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .  Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  be the subset 
of terminal nodes that are reachable when  ￿ ￿  is played, that is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  if and only if for 
some  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Similarly,  define  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   to  be  all  nodes  that  are  reachable 
under  ￿ ￿ . We may extend this definition to mixed strategies  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  by requiring that the 
nodes or information sets be reachable with positive probability; we will make use of 
both mixed and behavior strategies for reasons that will become clear shortly. We will 
also need to refer to the information sets that are reached with positive probability under 
￿ , denoted  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  
  We now model the idea that each player has a belief about his opponents’ play 
(including  the  play  of  Nature.)  Because  many  different  mixed  strategies  can  be 
observationally equivalent, it is easiest to model beliefs as a probability measure over 
￿ ￿ ￿ , the set of other players’ behavior strategies. Let  ￿ ￿  denote the belief of player  ￿.  
For a fixed  ￿ ￿ , the marginal probability of a node  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is determined by  i m :    
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The support of this distribution defined to be the set  ( , ) i i X s m . The distribution  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
generates a utility function on strategies:    7 
 
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Frequently  ￿ ￿   has  a  continuous  density  ￿ ￿   over  ￿ ￿￿ .  In  this  case  we  write 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and  ( , ) i i X s g . 
Since each player moves at most once along any path of play, Kuhn’s Theorem 
implies that for any mixed strategy profile  s  there exists a unique behavior strategy 
profile  ￿  that is observationally equivalent to  s . 
3  We say that player ￿’s belief  ￿ ￿  is 
correct at an opponent j’s information set  ￿  if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . In our 
learning model, there are many agents in the role of each player, and each agent will play 
a pure strategy, so that a state of the system will be a vector of probability distributions 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where each  i q  is a distribution over the pure strategies of player i, 
and  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the exogenous distribution over Nature’s move.  Henceforth we will 
use q  to stand for mixed strategy profiles, and let  ￿  be the set of all mixed strategy 
profiles.  We will need to make use of mixed strategy profiles in order to allow for the 
fact different agents in the role of a given player may have different beliefs. 
4. Final-Move Admissibility and Subgame Confirmed Nash Equilibrium 
We turn next to concepts of equilibrium.  Let the penultimate nodes be those all of 
whose immediate successors are terminal nodes; these nodes represent the “final moves” 
in the tree.
4  We refer to a profile as final-move admissible if no player plays a sub-
optimal action at any final move (that is, penultimate node). We will see later that all play 
in the learning model must be final-move admissible; intuitively, at these nodes beliefs 
about  ￿ ￿￿  are irrelevant and the player has a simple choice between alternatives with 
known payoffs.  
In addition to this restriction, the steady states of the learning model will have the 
property that players have correct beliefs about play at nodes where they have infinitely 
many observations.  Just which nodes these are is endogenous, and will depend on the 
discount  factor,  as  increasing  patience  leads  to  an  increased  amount  of 
                                                 
3 Note that because we restrict attention to simple games, the issue of defining player i’s conditional play at 
an information set that player i’s own strategy makes unreachable does not arise. 
4  A node that is not a penultimate node can be the last move by a player if all of its successors correspond 
to moves by Nature.  These are not “final moves” according to our definition; at such nodes a player’s 
expected payoff depends on his beliefs about Nature.   8 
“experimentation.”    Our  first  notion  of  equilibrium,  self-confirming  equilibrium, 
corresponds to the case of myopic players who do no experimentation at all. Thus it 
imposes only the restriction that players learn what happens on the equilibrium path.  
Definition 4.1: ￿  is a self-confirming equilibrium if for each player ￿ and for each  ￿ ￿  
with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  there are beliefs  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  
(a)  ￿ ￿  is a best response to  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and  
(b)  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is correct at every  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , 
It is important to note that this definition allows player ￿ to rationalize each  ￿ ￿  in 
the support of  ￿ ￿  with a different beliefs.   This is because we want the equilibrium 
concepts we develop to correspond to steady states of learning models with anonymous 
random matching: In those models, there will be many agents in the role of each player, 
and different agents may hold different beliefs.  Note also that Nash equilibrium differs 
by strengthening (b) to hold at all information sets. Finally, note that self-confirming 
equilibrium  allows  players  to  have  any  beliefs  about  opponents’  play  that  are  not 
contradicted by their observations.  The “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium” of 
Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine [1999] strengthens this concept by restricting attention to 
beliefs that are consistent with almost common knowledge of the payoff functions.
5 
  Our goal is to understand the consequences of optimal off-path experimentation 
by patient players. First we define what it means to be “one-step off the equilibrium 
path.”  
 
Definition  4.2:  In  a  simple  game,  node  x  is  one  step  off  the  path  of  p   if  it  is  an 
immediate successor of a node that is reached with positive probability under p .  
   
 Our learning theory will imply that players have some knowledge of off-path play, but 
less knowledge about off-path play than about on-path play. The relevant equilibrium 
concept is 
 
                                                 
5 See also Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1994].   9 
Definition 4.3: Profile p  is a subgame-confirmed equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium 
and if, in  each subgame beginning one step off the path, the restriction of  p  to the 
subgame is self-confirming in that subgame.  
 
Subgame-confirmed equilibrium strengthens Nash equilibrium by imposing the 
requirement  that  (one-step)  off-path  play  be  a  self-confirming  equilibrium.  Every 
subgame-perfect equilibrium is subgame confirmed; the subgame-confirmed condition is 
weaker in two respects. First, subgame-confirmed equilibrium imposes no constraints on 
play in subgames that are two or more steps off of the equilibrium path.  Second, in the 
subgames that are one step off of the equilibrium path, subgame-confirmed equilibrium 
asks  only  that  play  is  a  self-confirming  equilibrium,  instead  of  requiring  Nash 
equilibrium. In our learning model, it turns out that players need not acquire enough 
information about play  two-steps off the equilibrium path to force their beliefs to be 
accurate there. So the relevant equilibrium concept only restricts beliefs to be accurate at 
subgames that are one step off of the equilibrium path, which is why the play in these 
subgames need only be a self-confirming equilibrium: The conclusion that play one step 
off the equilibrium path must be a Nash equilibrium would require that beliefs two steps 
off the path must be correct. 
Before turning to the model of steady state learning, we consider some simple 
examples  to  illustrate  the  contrast  between  subgame-confirming  equilibrium  and  
subgame perfect equilibrium.  
First, consider a simple game with no more than two consecutive moves. Here 
self-confirming equilibrium for any player moving second implies optimal play by that 
player. Consequently, subgame-confirmed equilibrium implies subgame perfection. Our 
next example shows how this fails when there are three consecutive moves. 
Example 4.1: The Three Player Centipede Game 
Three players move in order. If a player drops the game ends, if he passes the 
next player gets to move. Payoff are given in the diagram below: basically everyone 
prefers to pass if he thinks the next player is going do so, and drop if he thinks the next 
player is going to drop.   10 
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is clearly for all players to pass. However we 
claim that (drop, drop, pass) is final-move admissible and subgame-confirmed.
6   It is 
obviously a Nash equilibrium, since player 1 is playing a best response to player 2’s 
strategy  of  dropping.  We  must  also  have  that  drop,  pass  is  self-confirming  in  the 
subgame beginning with player 2’s move. It is, since if player 2 drops, he does not see 
player  3’s  move,  and  so  may  believe  that  player  3  is  dropping,  even  though  this  is 
incorrect.  The  point  is  that  subgame  perfection  requires  beliefs  to  be  correct  in  all 
subgames; subgame-confirmed equilibrium requires them only to be correct on the path 
of the subgame that starts one step from the equilibrium path.
7 
  This example leaves open the issue of whether a subgame-confirmed equilibrium 
is path-equivalent to the requirement that the profile yield a Nash equilibrium at every 
node that is one step off of the path. A more elaborate 4-player centipede example shows 
how the two differ.
8  Intuitively, we create a conflict between player 1’s and player 2’s 
incentive constraints, so that for them both to play as specified, player 3 must randomize. 
However,  we  can  structure  the  subgame  starting  with  player  2  passing  so  that 
randomization by 3 is possible in self-confirming but not Nash equilibrium. Because the 
details are somewhat complicated, they can be found in Appendix B. 
                                                 
6 The profile (drop, drop, drop) is subgame-confirmed but not final-move admissible. 
7 Past work had suggested that subgame perfection is not necessary for patient stability; see the discussions 
in Fudenberg and Kreps [1996] and Fudenberg and Levine [1999]. 
8 The “k-step perfection” of Kalai and Neme [1992] imposes Nash equilibrium at all nodes k or fewer steps 
off of the path, so the example shows that subgame-confirmed equilibrium is not equivalent to “1-step 
perfection.” 
1
2
3
drop (1,0,0)
(0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
(2,2,2)
drop
drop
pass
pass
pass  11 
  We should point out that replacing a terminal node by a move by Nature with the 
same expected payoff under the objective distribution on Nature’s move can enlarge the 
set  of  subgame-confirmed  payoffs  unless  the  original  terminal  node  was  on  the 
equilibrium  path.    This  change  has  no  impact  in  the  usual  model  where  players  are 
assumed to have correct beliefs over all moves by Nature, but it is natural in a setting 
where players need to observe Nature’s moves to learn them. Similarly, there are many 
other transformations of games that have no impact on the set of Nash equilibria, but that 
matter here: In a Bayesian learning model, the keys are what players are assumed to 
know at the start and what they observe when the game is played, that is, their priors and 
likelihood functions.
9 In a similar vein, but the opposite direction, there are changes to 
the game tree, such as moving Nature’s move to the beginning of the game, but making it 
unknown to the players until later, that do not change what players learn at the end of the 
game: these types of changes cannot change the steady states of the learning model.
10 
 5. Rational Steady-State Learning 
The Agent’s Decision Problem: We now consider an “agent” in the role of player 
i.  This agent expects to play the game ￿  times and wishes to maximize 
  ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿  
where  ￿ ￿  is the realized stage game payoff at ￿  and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
The agent believes that he faces a fixed time invariant probability distribution of 
opponents’ strategies, but is unsure what the true distribution is.  This belief will be 
correct in the steady states we analyze, and approximately correct in the neighborhood of 
a stable steady state.
11 
                                                 
9 It is easy to extend our model to allow players to have objectively known distributions over certain moves 
by Nature, presumably ones that the players observe frequently either in this or some other game.  
10 However they can change the set of subgame confirmed equilibrium by changing the set of subgames; 
analogous issues arise in comparing subgame perfection and sequential equilibrium. 
11A model of out-of-equilibrium learning must allow the players’ beliefs to be systematically wrong, as the 
only way to avoid this is to assume that play in the overall system corresponds to an equilibrium. (Aumann 
[1987].)  Thus the issue is not whether the beliefs are always correct, but whether we should expect the 
agents to detect the errors, which depends on the cost of the error and the difficulty of detecting it. Thus the 
assumption that players think the world is stationary is more plausible in cases when the world is at least 
approximately  stationary,  as  in  neighborhood  of  stable  steady  state.  Aoyagi  [1994],  Foster  and  Vohra 
[1997], Fudenberg and Levine [1999], and Lambson and Probst [2004] study learning in games when 
agents try to detect various sorts of time-varying patterns such as cycles.   12 
Definition  5.1:  A  belief  ￿ ￿   is  non-doctrinaire  if  it  is  given  by  a  continuous  density 
function  ￿ ￿  that is strictly positive at interior points. 
Note that this definition allows priors to go to zero on the boundary.
12 
Player  ￿ is assumed to have a prior  ￿
￿ ￿  that is non-doctrinaire and independent.  
This belief is updated using Bayes Law: We let  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the posteriors starting 
with prior  ￿ ￿  after ￿  is observed.  It is straightforward to show that non-doctrinaire priors 
imply non-doctrinaire posteriors.   
 
Optimal Play in the Agent’s Decision Problem: Each agent observes only his own play 
and the terminal nodes in games that he has played; the private history of agent i through 
time ￿  is a sequence ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿ ￿  be the set of all such histories with 
length no more than ￿ , and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the length of history  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . There is also a 
null history ￿. 
  Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the posterior density over opponent’s strategies given sample  ￿ ￿ , 
and  let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   be  the  corresponding  distribution  over  terminal  nodes.  Let  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
denote the maximized average discounted value (in current units) starting at  ￿ ￿  with ￿  
periods remaining. Bellman’s equation is 
  ￿
￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿  
where  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote a solution of this 
problem.  It is convenient to abbreviate  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
and  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  An optimal policy is a map  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  defined by 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Notice that there can be more than one optimal policy; for example several strategies may 
                                                 
12  We use this definition, as opposed to the stronger version with densities that are uniformly bounded 
away  from  zero,  because  posterior  beliefs  will  typically  assign  probability  0  to  distributions  that  are 
inconsistent with the sample – that is, after seeing one “Heads,” the posterior density is 0 at the point 
“always Tails.”  The assumption rules out players being  certain that a particular opponent’s action is 
dominated, but it allows them to believe that this is true with high probability; we view it as mild and very 
reasonable.  At the technical level, Bayesian updating can have bizarre consequences when the true state is 
in a neighborhood that has prior probability 0, while the non-doctrinaire assumption lets us appeal to the 
Diaconis-Freedman [1990] result that Bayesian posteriors converge to the empirical distribution function.    13 
be strategically equivalent. Note also that there will always be an optimal policy that is 
deterministic.    
  Recall  that  a  strategy  ￿ ￿   is  final-move  admissible  if  it  prescribes  final-move-
admissible actions at every final move of player  ￿, and say that a policy is final-move 
admissible if it prescribes a final-move admissible strategy for every history. 
Lemma 5.1: Every optimal policy is final-move admissible. 
Proof:  The  optimal  policy  will  assign  probability  0  to  an  action  unless  it  either  (a) 
maximizes the current period’s expected payoff or (b) increases expected payoff in future 
periods by providing information about actions that have a positive probability of being 
myopically optimal. However, final moves cannot generate any information, as they lead 
to terminal nodes, and we have assumed that players know the map from terminal nodes 
to payoffs.                    ￿ 
 
Steady  States  in  an  Overlapping  Generations  Model:  We  suppose  that  there  is  a 
continuum population, with a unit mass of agents in the role of each player. There is a 
doubly infinite sequence of periods; generations overlap, so there are ￿￿ ￿  agents in each 
generation, with  ￿￿ ￿  new agents entering each population each period to replace the 
￿￿ ￿  oldest players who leave. Every period, each agent is randomly and independently 
matched with one agent from each of the other populations. In particular, the probability 
of meeting an agent of a particular age is equal to its population fraction ￿￿ ￿ ; agents do 
not observe the ages or past experiences of their opponents. 
  We assume (by subdividing populations and adding player roles to the game if 
necessary) that each population i has a common prior, and uses a common deterministic 
optimal policy  ￿ ￿ .
13 Suppose we are given the fractions of each population  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of each 
population that play the corresponding  i s . Using the rule  ￿ ￿  we may then work out the 
fractions  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of the population with each experience  ￿ ￿ . The new entrants have no 
experience, so  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We then calculate iteratively for each ( , ( ), ) i i i y r y z  
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ .  (*) 
                                                 
13 For example, if one third the player 1’s have prior p and two-thirds have prior q,  we can view this as two 
distinct populations called “1p” and “1q.” Each period, each player 2 then has probability 1/3 of matching 
with a player 1p.   14 
Denote the resulting distribution over histories as  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  We can 
then compute the population fractions playing each strategy:  
 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
This is a polynomial map from the space  ￿ of mixed strategy profiles to itself, and so 
has a fixed point. These fixed points are the steady states of the system.
14 
 
Patient Stability: For each non-doctrinaire prior 
0 g , discount factor  ￿ ￿ ￿  and length of 
life ￿  there are optimal rules, and steady states with respect to those rules 
0 ( , ) g T d Q , . If  
for some fixed 
￿ ￿  and d  there is  a sequence 
0 ( , , )
T g T q d ÎQ  with lim
T
T q q ®¥ ® , we 
say that q  is a ￿ -stable state. If  ( ) q d  are ￿ -stable states and  1 lim ( ) d q d q ® ® , we say 
that q  is a patiently stable state.   
We will say that two profiles  , q q¢ are path equivalent if they induce the same 
distribution over terminal nodes.  
Theorem  5.1:    (Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1993b])  d -steady  states  are  self-confirming 
equilibria; patiently stable states are Nash equilibria.
15 
  Note  that  a  strategy  profile  is  stable  or  patiently  stable  if  there  exists  a  non-
doctrinaire prior such that the relevant conditions are satisfied. In general, we expect the 
set of steady states to depend on the prior.
16 Note also that since steady states exist for all 
lifetimes, and the space of population fractions is compact, patiently stable states exist. 
                                                 
14 If we consider steady states of the deterministic dynamical system whose state is the fraction of agents 
with each history, the strategy frequencies in those steady states correspond to steady states as defined here. 
In our earlier work [1993b] we defined steady states in the larger space of fraction of agents with each 
history.  However,  it  is  technically  easier  to  deal  with  steady  states  in  the  smaller  space  of  strategy 
frequencies,  since  this  space  does  not  change  as  we  vary  the  length  of  life.  The  two  definitions  are 
equivalent: given population fractions with each history and the optimal rule, we can easily compute the 
unique strategy frequencies; given the strategy frequencies and the optimal rules, we can work the optimal 
strategies forward to uniquely find the steady state population fractions with each history as shown in (*). 
15 Our [1993b] paper states this result for the case where agents know the distribution of Nature’s move, but 
the result extends to the present setting. The key fact is that our argument showed that in patiently stable 
state, each  ￿ ￿  must maximize  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , regardless of how  ￿ ￿￿  is generated. 
16 Think for example of the steady states in a symmetric coordination game.    15 
6. Patient Stability in Simple Games 
This section presents our main results, and uses them to analyze the Hammurabi 
games that were presented in Section 2.  The main result of this paper is loosely speaking 
that in simple games, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is path-equivalent to a patiently 
stable steady state.  To prove this, we must first rule out some types of weakly dominated 
strategy. The problem is illustrated by a simple two-player game “niceness” game. 
Example 6.1 The Niceness Game 
  Player 1 moves first, either exit or in. If he exits both players get zero. If he plays 
in, player 2 can be nice or mean. Player 2 gets zero either way, but if he is mean player 1 
gets zero, while if he is nice, player 1 gets one.  
It is a subgame-confirmed equilibrium, indeed subgame perfect, for player 1 to 
exit, and player 2 to play mean.  But player 1 knows his payoff to exit is zero, and with 
non-doctrinaire  priors,  his  posterior  is  non-doctrinaire,  so  he  has  a  positive  expected 
payoff relative to his posterior by playing in. So in any steady state he must play in, 
which shows that being subgame-confirmed is not always sufficient for patient stability. 
 
   This problem can be avoided assuming that there are no ties in payoffs, but this 
would rule out the Hammurabi game with a river, since the suspect only cares whether he 
is punished or not, and there are a number of ways he may fail to be punished. Instead, 
we  will  make  the  weaker  assumption  that  no  player  has  two  different  actions  at  an 
information set that can possibly result in a tie in his own payoff.  In addition, we require 
that this “no-ties” property holds when the game is transformed by moving all of Nature’s 
1
2
exit (0,0)
(0,0)
(1,0)
mean
in
nice  16 
moves to the end of the game and then replacing each of Nature’s moves with a terminal 
node assigning the vector of expected utilities generated by that move.  Notice that the 
first condition is satisfied for generic assignments of payoff vectors to terminal nodes, 
and that in a game in which the first condition is satisfied, the second is satisfied for 
generic assignments of probabilities to Nature. We refer to such games that satisfy both 
assumptions  as  having  no  own  ties.  This  is  satisfied  in  particular  by  the  Hammurabi 
game: there are ties in the suspect’s payoff function, but these ties all occur when he 
chooses to commit a crime, so two distinct own actions are not involved. Notice also that 
this assumption implies that a player playing in the final stage of the game has a unique 
best choice, and by backwards induction, every perfect information game with no own 
ties has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
  We  define  a  profile  as  nearly  pure  if  there  are  no  randomizations  on  the 
equilibrium  path,  and  no  player  except  Nature  randomizes  off  the  equilibrium  path. 
Notice  that  our  proposed  Hammurabi  game  no-crime  profile  is  nearly  pure,  as  only 
Nature randomizes, and only off the equilibrium path. 
Theorem 6.1: In simple games with no own ties, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium that 
is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
  The  proof  is  in  Section  7  below,  here  is  a  simplified  sketch:  To  provide  a 
sufficient condition, we can assume that beliefs are independent, so that players believe 
there is no correlation between how an opponent plays at different information sets, or 
how different opponents play; this implies that the only information a player has about  
play at a given node comes from observations of play at that node. When agents are 
patient  and  long-lived,  most  agents  who  are  reached  along  the  steady  state  path  are  
playing a best response to the true distribution. These agents only play off path actions as 
experiments, or if their samples misleadingly suggest that off-path play is optimal.  A 
strong-law-type argument says their samples are unlikely to be misleading, and for any 
fixed discount factor, the fraction of time that an agent experiments goes to 0. These 
results imply that agents off the path are reached a fraction of time that goes to 0, which  
in turn implies that off-path players are unlikely to get samples that suggest their nodes 
are likely to be reached. Thus, for a non-negligible set of priors, even very patient players 
do not do any experiments at off-path nodes.    17 
Note that in simple games with no own ties, players will not randomize on the 
path of any Nash equilibrium. We do not know whether the restriction to nearly pure 
equilibria is necessary.  In order for a subgame-imperfect equilibrium to be patiently 
stable, players must maintain incorrect beliefs at some parts of the game tree, which 
requires bounds on the amount of experimentation at off-path nodes.  We have been 
unable  to  establish  this  bound  when  there  is  mixing  on  the  equilibrium  path.  The 
difficulty is that the amount of experimentation at off-path nodes depends on how often 
those nodes are reached. We show in the proof of Theorem 6.1 that for a fixed discount 
factor ￿ lack of randomization on the equilibrium path implies the frequency with which 
off-path nodes are reached goes to zero as ￿ ￿ ￿. If there is randomization on the 
path, then some players will get sufficiently misleading samples of the path that they will 
“lock on” to playing a non-equilibrium action; this corresponds to players getting stuck 
on the wrong arm in a bandit problem. It is known that the fraction who get stuck falls to 
zero as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ; we can show that if the fraction falls faster than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then Theorem 
6.1 holds even with randomization on the equilibrium path. Unfortunately the rate of 
convergence  of  choosing  the  wrong  arm  in  bandit  problems  does  not  appear  to  be 
known.
17  
The following partial converse to theorem 6.1 will show that patient stability has 
very different implications in the games with and without a river.
18 Recall that a profile is 
final-move admissible if no player plays a sub-optimal action at any penultimate node. 
Note that at penultimate nodes, beliefs are irrelevant to optimality. 
Theorem 6.2: A patiently stable state ￿  is a final-move admissible Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
17 The argument underlying the  need for  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is explained in footnote 23. 
18 We believe that if beliefs are “weakly independent” there is a full converse to theorem 6.1; that is, a 
patiently stable state must be path equivalent to a subgame confirmed Nash equilibrium. Because the key 
point of this paper is that superstitions that are subgame-confirmed can survive, we do not pursue this 
converse in detail. To sketch the argument, weak independence means that moves at a given node do not 
reveal information about play at other nodes. Without this assumption, off-path play may not be a response 
to incentives, but rather an attempt to gain information about play at some other part of the game tree. (For 
example, the accuser may experiment with false accusations in hopes of learning about the probability of 
crimes being committed.) With this assumption, however, we can conclude that players play optimally one-
step off the path most of the time. Using an option value argument from our earlier paper, we can then  
show that most players beliefs about certain “decisive” off-path nodes must be nearly correct most of the 
time.  Optimal  play  together  with  correct  beliefs  one-step  off  the  path  gives  subgame  confirmed 
equilibrium.   18 
Note that this result applies to all games, not just to simple ones. 
Proof: Our  past  work  showed  that  a  patiently  stable  steady  state  must  be  a  Nash 
equilibrium. Lemma 5.1 shows that every optimal policy is final-move admissible, so the 
same is true of any steady state and any limit of steady states. 
 
￿ 
Note that in games with length at most two, a final move admissible Nash equilibrium is 
subgame perfect, while a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is as well. 
Example 2.3 Continued: The Lightning Game 
In the lightning game, the no-crime profile is a self-confirming equilibrium, since 
the information set for nature at which a crime is committed is not observed.  It is not a 
Nash equilibrium, since the suspect is not playing a best response to Nature’s strategy. 
Hence the no-crime profile is not patiently stable.  
Example 2.2 Continued: The Hammurabi Game Without A River 
In the game without the river, profile (exit, truth) is a Nash equilibrium, because 
the accuser is off the path of play and so is willing to tell the truth. However, in his final 
move it is optimal for the accuser to lie, so (exit, truth) is not final-move admissible, 
hence is not patiently stable. The only Nash equilibrium where the accuser lies is (crime, 
lie), so by Theorem 6.2 this is the only patiently stable state,   
Example 2.1 Continued: The Hammurabi Game  
In the Hammurabi game, if the suspect exits, the only subgame that is one step off 
the equilibrium path is the game in which the accuser decides whether or not to lie.  In 
this subgame, it is self-confirming for him to tell the truth, and believe he will not be 
punished  for  telling  the  truth,  which  gives  payoff  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   each  time  a  crime  is 
committed; this equilibrium is supported by the belief that if he were to lie he would be 
punished with probability one, receiving  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . (This conclusion uses our assumption 
that  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .)  So  (exit,  truth)  is  a  subgame-confirmed  equilibrium,  and  hence  by 
Theorem 6.1, it is patiently stable. Moreover, (exit, truth) and (crime, lie) are the only   19 
Nash equilibrium outcomes, so the set of patiently stable states is path-equivalent to the 
set of subgame-confirmed equilibria. 
 
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 6.1, we provide a sufficient condition 
for patient stability that endogenizes the restriction to nearly pure strategies. We will say 
that a game has “length at most three” if no path through the tree hits more than three 
information sets.  
Lemma 6.3: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most 
three,  a  subgame-confirmed  equilibrium  is  path  equivalent  to  a  subgame-confirmed 
equilibrium in which players play pure strategies. 
The example in Appendix B shows the role of the assumption of length at most three. 
That  game  has  length  four,  and  as  we  saw  there  is  a  subgame-confirmed  Nash 
equilibrium that is not path equivalent to a pure subgame-confirmed equilibrium.  Our 
proof of Lemma 6.3 uses the following result on self-confirming equilibria in games of 
length at most two: 
Lemma 6.4: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most two, 
every self-confirming equilibrium is path equivalent to a public randomization over Nash 
equilibria. 
Proof: Fix a self-confirming equilibrium  p , and let the first player be player 1. Each 
strategy that has positive probability under  p  is a best response to some belief about 
other player actions in all other subgames. In particular it is a best response to the belief 
that following every other action  1 s  the player  ￿  that follows chooses the action that is 
worst for player 1 in that subgame; call these actions  1 ( ) j s s .  Moreover, because there are 
no own ties, in each subgame that is reached by p , player  ￿ ￿ ￿  plays a pure strategy; 
call these  ( )
*
1 j s s . Thus for each 
'
1 s  in the support of p , the profile  
 
'
1 1
' * '
1 1
'
1 1 1 1
,
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
j j
j j
s s
s s s s
s s s s s s
=
=
= ¹
 
is a Nash equilibrium, so the self-confirming equilibrium p  is path-equivalent to a public 
randomization over pure-strategy  Nash equilibria.   20 
￿ 
Proof of Lemma 6.3: Fix a subgame-confirmed equilibrium of a game of length at most 
three.    For  each  first-player  action  that  has  zero  probability,  specify  that  play  in  the 
resulting subgame will be one of the Nash equilibria that is worst for the first player 
moving. These continuation equilibria will be in pure strategies, and because the self-
confirming  equilibrium  specified  for  these  subgames  were  randomizations  over  Nash 
equilibria, picking the worst Nash equilibrium will preserve the first player’s incentives 
not to deviate.  Finally, the assumption of no own ties implies that the first player cannot 
randomize, so the strategies we have constructed are pure.  
￿ 
Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.1 yield the following corollary:  
 Theorem 6.5: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most 
three, a subgame-confirmed equilibrium is path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
Although the class of simple games with no Nature’s move and length at most 
three  is  quite  special,  it  includes  many  important  games  that  have  been  extensively 
studied  by  experimentalists,  including  the  ultimatum,  best  shot,  chain  store,  peasant- 
dictator, and trust games. In the even more special, but also important case of games of 
length at most two, Theorem 6.1 and the equivalence of both final-move admissibility 
and subgame-confirmed equilibrium to subgame perfection gives rise to the following 
very sharp result: 
Theorem 6.6: In simple games with no own ties, no Nature’s move and length at most 
two, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is path equivalent to the set of patiently stable 
states. 
7. Proof of Theorem 6.1 
We will now give the proof of Theorem 6.1.   
Theorem  6.1:  In  simple  games  with  no  own  ties,  a  subgame-confirmed  Nash   
equilibrium that is nearly pure is path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
Let  ￿ ￿  be a nearly-pure subgame confirmed equilibrium. Define a function on 
states ￿   (that is, distributions over strategies) as follows:   21 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
where  0 l  is the maximum of the difference between the probabilities assigned by ￿  and 
￿ ￿   to  any  pure  action  at  any  information  set  on  the  path  of  ￿ ￿ ,  and  ￿ ￿   is  the  same 
maximum over information sets one step off the path of ￿ ￿ . 
Now consider a  ￿  such that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Recall that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the play 
generated by the optimal dynamic learning rules in the environment defined by ￿  when 
players live ￿  periods, and that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the associated distribution over histories. In 
outline, our proof of the theorem relies on showing that there are (non-doctrinaire) priors 
such that the maps  :
T f Q® Q  map certain neighborhoods of  ￿ ￿  to themselves, where 
the neighborhoods are defined by the  l - metric and  Q is the set of all mixed strategy 
profiles. We will conclude that the maps have a sequence of fixed points that converge to 
a suitable limit as T ® ¥ .  This limit need not be  ￿ ￿ ; we only establish that the limit is 
path equivalent to it.   
The proof uses a combination of new results specific to simple games and more 
general lemmas about rational learning and the law of large numbers, some of which are 
new and others we take from our previous work.  This section states and proves the 
lemmas  about  simple  games;  Appendix  A  collects  all  of  the  more  general  statistical 
lemmas, and gives proofs for the lemmas that are new. 
Turning to the details of the proof, we will measure the distance between two 
beliefs of player i by the distance (in the sup norm) between their expected values, that is 
by the maximum difference in the probabilities assigned to any pure action at any node, 
and we will measure the distance between beliefs and the state ￿  in the same way. 
Since each  ￿ ￿ ￿  is a best response to  ￿ ￿￿
￿ , and there are no own ties, each player’s 
action at each information set on the path of ￿ ￿ is a strict best response to the actual play 
of the other players. Therefore there is an  ￿ ￿ ￿  such that each player’s on-path actions 
are a strict best response to any  i - ￿  that is within  ￿  of  ￿ ￿￿
￿ at every information set. In 
addition, every player i’s actions at nodes one step off the path are also a strict best 
response  to  some  strictly  positive  belief  ￿ ￿ ￿   that  supports  ￿ ￿   as  subgame  confirmed.  
Moreover, there is such a  ￿ ￿ ￿ , and an  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that for any belief within ￿  of  mi
￿  any 
action that is not an (ex ante) best response to  ￿ ￿  has expected payoff (relative to that 
belief) of at least e ￿ lower than that of the best response.   22 
We  say  that  priors  are  ￿ ￿ ￿ -strongly  accurate  for  a  node  x  if  fewer  than  n 
observations can  not make the expected probability of actions at that node differ from ￿ ￿  
by  more than e . Define  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  We say that priors are strongly accurate if they 
are  ￿ ￿ ￿ -strongly accurate at all nodes.   
Since  we  are  free  to  choose  any  non-doctrinaire  priors  in  order  to  prove  the 
Theorem,  we  can  specify  that  the  priors  are  independent  across  opponents  and 
information sets, and come from the Dirichlet family.  Specifically, we set    
  ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  
where  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is  a  Dirichlet  distribution  on  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   with  prior  mean  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and 
“initial intensity”  ( ) x g . Thus, when n observations have been acquired at x and observed 
play there corresponds to  ￿￿ ￿ , the posterior mean (i.e. expected play) at x is the mixed 
strategy  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  The first lemma shows that if priors are strongly accurate then beliefs about on-
path play “are close to” p ￿.  This is useful both in showing that most players in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
conform to the path of p ￿ (Lemma 7.3) and in showing that there is little experimentation 
off of the path of play (Lemma 7.5.)   
Lemma 7.1: If priors are independent Dirichlet and strongly accurate, then for all  ￿  
such that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  with  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and all  ￿￿ ￿ , the fraction of agents in 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  whose beliefs about on-path play are more than e  from ￿ ￿  is no more than  0 /2 e . 
Proof: Since beliefs are independent, player ￿  learns nothing about the on-path play of 
other players at information sets that come after hers in periods in which she deviates 
from  ￿ ￿ . Consequently, ￿ ’s belief about on-path play at any information set at any date 
￿  is obtained by using the ￿ ￿ ￿  observations of that information set that are available 
from periods where she did not deviate.  Since the posterior mean of the agent’s belief 
will be a convex combination of the prior and the sample, and strongly accurate priors are 
within ￿  of ￿ ￿ , whenever the sample is within ￿  of ￿ ￿ , the posterior will be within ￿  of 
￿ ￿  as well. From the assumption of strongly accurate priors, we know that there is no 
sample path of length less than  ￿ that can make any player  ￿ ’s posterior belief about 
￿ ’s play be at least  ￿  from  ￿ ￿ .   It is thus sufficient to show that, of the agents with 
samples of length  n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than  ￿  from   23 
￿ ￿  is no more than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Since q  is within  ￿ ￿ ￿  of ￿ ￿ , we will show that of the agents 
with samples of length n or more at node x, the fraction whose sample is more than  ￿ ￿ ￿  
from  q  is no more than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  This will follow from a version of the law of large 
numbers.  
Since on-path play of  ￿ ￿  is pure, there is a single terminal node 
* z  to which  ￿ ￿  
assigns probability 1.
19 For each player j who plays on the equilibrium path of  ￿ ￿ , let 
( ) j z I  be the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if  ￿  deviated from ￿ ￿  and 0 if 
￿  conformed. Let   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the expected vale of  j I  under ￿ , and let 
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 be  the  deviation  of  the  sample  average  of  j I   from  its  mean.      Lemma  A.1  from 
Appendix A implies that
20  
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where the equality comes from  the definition of ￿. 
  If the play prescribed by ￿  is within  0 e  of p ￿ at every information set on the path 
of play, then  0 j m e £ , and substituting this and taking  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  we have   
 
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
So, regardless of ￿ , at most  0 /3 e  of the agents can have samples of length  n or more  
that differ from ￿  at information sets on the equilibrium path by at least  ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
￿ 
Next we want to argue that players on the path of play are unlikely to have beliefs 
about off-path play that make them want to deviate. If player ￿ plays on the path of  ￿ ￿  
and ￿  is a deviation for player ￿ from the path of  ￿ ￿ , we say that his belief is  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-
path deviation inducing if there exists a strategy profile  i - ￿ ￿  for the opponents that is 
within e  of ￿ ￿  at on-path information sets such the strategy corresponding to ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  at on-
path information sets, and the strategy  
                                                 
19 The nearly pure assumption simplifies the presentation, but is not essential for this Lemma; the extension 
to on-path mixing by Nature requires that we specify a different and generally larger ￿ . 
20 Note that ￿  on the left does not matter, since it does not appear on the right.   24 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   
generated by the player’s actual belief about play at off-path nodes, imply a loss of no 
more than  ￿ from playing  ￿ rather than the path of  ￿ ￿ . Note that in simple games, a  
player’s belief about play following some other deviation  ' a  are irrelevant for whether 
the beliefs are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation inducing, as is the player’s belief about play at 
successors of a  to which the player assigns sufficiently  low probability. 
Lemma 7.2:  Suppose that all agents have priors that are independent, Dirichlet, and 
strongly accurate. For any  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and any state ￿  with   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and any ￿, 
as ￿ ￿ ￿ the fraction of agents in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  who play ￿ and have beliefs that are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-
path deviation-inducing goes to ￿. 
Proof:  In outline, we will show that for any  ' 0 e >  the fraction of agents in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  who 
play ￿  and have beliefs are  ￿ ￿ ￿ off-path deviation-inducing is no larger than  ￿ ￿ .  This 
will follow from the fact that the true state ￿  is not off-path deviation-inducing and the 
strong law of large numbers. 
To  make  this  precise,  let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   be  the  set  of  nodes  that  have  positive 
probability when player ￿ plays ￿ and the distribution of other player’s play is given by 
￿ ￿ ￿ . Let ￿  be the node where a is feasible.  Define  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be the frequency in the 
history  ￿ ￿  with which ￿  has been played when ￿  has been reached. Let  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the 
behavior strategy corresponding to ￿  according to Kuhn’s Theorem. Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the 
number of times ￿  has been hit given the sample  ￿ ￿ .  
Now consider the information that player i has about play at successors of action 
a.  Lemma  A.2  shows  that  for  all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   there  is  an  N  such  that  for  all 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , 
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
That is, at any node  ' x , only a few players (a) have seen that node be reached many times 
and (b) have observations that are substantially different from ￿ . Moreover, the share of 
such players can be made small by taking N sufficiently large. In particular, this is true at 
every node that is one step off of the equilibrium path, and every feasible action  ￿ ￿  at 
such information sets.  From that same lemma, for each node  ￿ ￿ , and any N and  ￿ ￿ , there 
is an  ' N  such that the fraction of players who have played  ￿ ￿  more than  ' N  times and   25 
seen  ￿ ￿  fewer than N times is less than  ' ￿ . Since X is finite, for any  N  and  ￿ ￿ , there is 
an  ' N  such the fraction of players who have played  ￿ ￿  more than  ' N  times and seen any 
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   fewer than N  times  is less than  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . Since  ￿ has finitely many 
successors, the same statement is also true simultaneously for all successors of ￿. Hence, 
fewer than  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  player i’s have samples that differ from  ￿ ￿￿  by more than  ￿ ￿  
Now fix an  ￿ ￿  such that  1 ' + < ￿ ￿ ￿ and the corresponding N¸ ' N . By taking “￿ ” 
in the previous paragraph equal to  ￿ ￿ , and considering the action ￿ on the equilibrium 
path rather than  ￿ ￿  one-step off-path, we may find an  " N  such that of those who have 
played a more than  " N  times, no more than  ' /3 ￿  have fewer than  ' N  observations on 
any  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  while  of  those  who  have  more  than  ' N   observations  on  all 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , at most  ' /3 ￿  have samples that differ from  ￿ ￿￿  by more than  ￿ ￿ . 
Thus, discarding the two groups of size  ' /3 ￿  we need to consider those players 
who play ￿ but have played it fewer than  ￿￿ ￿  times, and those who have more than  ￿ ￿  
observations on any  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  and have samples that differ from  ￿ ￿￿  by less than  ' ￿ . 
But as ￿ ￿ ￿ the fraction of histories in which  ￿ is currently played, but has been 
played fewer than  ￿￿ ￿  times necessarily goes to zero, so certainly drops to smaller than 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  
This leaves those players who have more than  ￿ ￿  observations on any  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  
and have samples that differ from  ￿ ￿￿  by less than  ' e . Since priors are strongly accurate, 
they are accurate, so these players’ beliefs at  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  are within  1 ' + < ￿ ￿ ￿  of  ˆ m . 
Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  are the nodes reached with positive probability at  ￿ ￿￿  when ￿ is played, 
beliefs at other reachable nodes given ￿ are equal to the prior, that is ￿ ￿ .
21 By definition 
of  ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ it follows that  ￿ has an expected loss of at least  ￿ ￿. Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ these 
players’ beliefs are not  , a e  off-path deviation inducing.    ￿ 
 
  Using Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, we can conclude there are few deviations from the 
path of p ￿. 
                                                 
21 We do not need the full strength of this assumption, as beliefs two steps off the equilibrium path can be 
shown not to matter, but proving this requires additional argument. As we are free to pick the prior, we 
chose it to make the proof as easy as possible.   26 
Lemma  7.3:  Suppose  that  all  agents  have  priors  that  are  independent  Dirichlet  and 
strongly accurate. For any  ￿ ￿ >0 there is a ￿  so that in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the fraction of players 
who deviate at a node on the path of p ￿ is no greater than  ￿ ￿ .  
Proof:  Fix an  ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿  . From the definition of an off-path deviation-inducing belief, a  
player who deviates at an on-path node either (i) does not play an  ￿-static best-response 
to his belief, (ii) has a belief that is  ￿ ￿ ￿-off-path deviation inducing for some ￿ , or (iii) 
has a belief that is wrong by more than  ￿  about on-path play. The first class of agents 
goes to 0 with T by Lemma A.4, since ￿ ￿  is a strict equilibrium.
22  The second class goes 
to 0 with T from Lemma 7.2, and the third class is no more than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  from Lemma 7.1.   
￿ 
 
Next we want to argue that play must be close to p ￿ at nodes one step off of the 
equilibrium path.  To do so, we first bound beliefs about play at those nodes. 
Lemma 7.4: For all  1 e , there exists an  N  such that if priors are independent Dirichlet 
and  1 ,2 N e -strongly accurate at all nodes one step-off the path of  ￿ ￿ , then for all  0 , q e  
such that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and all  ￿￿ ￿ , the fraction of agents in  ( )
T f q  whose beliefs 
about one-step-off-path play are more than  ￿ ￿￿   from ￿ ￿  is no more than  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Proof: Denote by 
1 f e 2  the fraction of agents in  ( )
T f q  whose beliefs about one-step-off-
path play are more than  ￿ ￿￿  from  ￿ ￿ . To bound
1 f e 2 , recall that for any  ' e  Lemma A.2 
yields an  N  such that fewer than  1/4 e  players have seen a node more than N times and 
have a sample of play at that node that differs from the  ￿  by more than  ' e . Since the 
prior about this node is concentrated near  ￿ ￿ , and ￿  is within  ￿ ￿  of p ￿ at this nodes, by 
choosing  ' e  sufficiently small, these players have beliefs that are within  ￿￿ ￿  of  ￿ ￿  at 
those nodes. On the other hand, because we have assumed that priors are  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ -strongly 
accurate one-step-off the path, players who have seen the node fewer than N times have 
beliefs that are within  ￿ ￿￿  of ￿ ￿  at those nodes. 
￿ 
  Finally we use Lemmas 7.1 and 7.4 to conclude that one step off the path of play, 
most players’ actions are a best response to their priors.  
                                                 
22 In addition to the strong law, Lemma A.4 relies on the fact that the posterior distribution converges to the 
empirical c.d.f. at a uniform rate, as shown by Diaconis and Freedman [1990].   27 
Lemma 7.5: Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and let m ￿  be independent Dirichlet priors that support p ￿ as 
subgame-confirmed.  For any  1 e  there exists  N  such that if  m ￿  is  strongly accurate and 
is also  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ -strong one step-off the path of  ˆ p , then for all d  there is an  0 0 e >  such 
that if   ￿  satisfies  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , then in  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ the fraction of players who fail to 
play a best response to their priors is less than ￿￿￿ ￿. 
Proof: The actual probability of being off the path of p ￿ goes to zero as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  and 
lemma 7.1 shows that as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the fraction of the population who ever believes that 
the probability of being off the path is large must be small.  By Lemma A.5, a player who 
believes  that  the  chance  of  being  at  a  node  is  small  relative  to 
2 (1 ) d -   will  not 
experiment at that node, so as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  most players play a best response to their beliefs 
whenever they are at nodes that are off the path of play.
23 Lemma 7.4 shows that most  
players have beliefs about one-step-off-path play less than  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  from  ￿ ￿ ; since they 
have never experimented, their best response to their beliefs are a best response to their 
priors.  
￿ 
Proof of Theorem 6.1: We show that p ￿ is a path equivalent to a patiently stable state. 
(Recall that a patiently stable state is a limit first as T ® ¥  then as  1 d ®  of the steady 
state path of play.) Recall that we have fixed  ￿￿ ￿ . Fix  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . We may then choose 
N   independent of  T   so that for any d  there is an  0 e  such that Lemma 7.5 holds with 
the fraction failing to play a best-response to their priors no greater than  1 e . Fix a prior m ￿  
that supports p ￿ as subgame confirmed, that is strongly accurate (relative to  ￿ ￿ ￿ ) and is 
also  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! -strongly accurate one-step off the path. We will keep this prior fixed as we 
vary  ,T d . Fix d . Since by Lemma 7.5 the fraction failing to play a best-response to their 
priors one-step off of the path is no greater than  1 e , and  m ￿  supports  ￿ ￿  as subgame-
confirmed, this implies that all but  1 e  play according to p ￿ one-step off the path, that is 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . By choosing T  large enough we can conclude from Lemma 7.3 that 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . Hence there is a fixed point, that is, steady state, with a path within 
￿ ￿  of  ￿ ￿ . Since  0 e  can be arbitrarily small, this implies that the limit for each  d  as 
                                                 
23 Because the probability of off-path nodes goes to 0 as T goes to infinity (due to the assumption that ￿ ￿  is 
nearly pure) the exact fraction of players failing to play a best response does not matter. If we drop the 
nearly-pure assumption, then as T goes to infinity we need to ensure that the fraction of players deviating 
from the path (and thus making mistakes given actual play) goes to zero with  ￿  at a rate faster than 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  so that we can apply Lemma A.5.   28 
T ® ¥   is  path  equivalent  to  p ￿.  As  this  remains  true  for  the  limit  as  1 d ® ,  this 
completes the proof. 
￿ 
8. The Economics of Superstition   
The “Hammurabi Game” is only loosely motivated by the Code of Hammurabi. 
The situation contemplated in the actual code is different in a variety of respects. To what 
extent is the basic insight that two-step off-path superstitions are patiently stable relevant 
to the actual code of  Hammurabi? Here we examine the simplifications made in our 
“Hammurabi Game” and how robust are our conclusions. 
 
¨  Death Penalty 
The most obvious feature of the Code of Hammurabi that differs from our model 
is that players who drown in the river or who are executed do not get to play again. We 
assume that information gained by an accuser or criminal who is punished is not lost to 
society. In practice, “individuals” in our model could be thought of as criminal gangs or 
families, so that the information about guilt, innocence and punishment is not lost to the 
gang. Moreover, the death penalty does not explain the durability of the Code. That is, 
the  relevant  learning  is  the  learning  by  false  accusers  that  they  are  not  likely  to  get 
punished – this particular information is not lost to society as it is known to individuals 
who survive. Our theory provides an explanation of why there are not enough of these 
surviving false accusers to upset the social norm. 
 
¨  Frequency of Play 
It is important in our analysis that the accuser does not have control over whether 
the crime takes place: If he did, he would control also the frequency with which he would 
be able to learn about the consequences of a false accusation. So we rule out situations 
such as the doctor who murders his wife and says “my wife is dead and my the one-
armed man did it.” Rather, we have in mind the following general type of situation: a 
murder occurs in the town square. Only one person – with no connection to the victim – 
is in a position to have observed the murderer. This person is then called upon to testify 
as a witness at the trial.    29 
We do not have a great deal of information about whether the types of crimes 
committed  in  the  time  of  Hammurabi  were  more  of  the  private  or  public  variety. 
However, while capital punishment was much more common in the Code of Hammurabi 
than it is today, there are many lesser punishments as well. Since the appeals procedure 
involves a substantial likelihood of both death and your heirs losing your house, it seems 
unlikely  that  the  appeals  procedure  would  have  been  frequently  used  when  small 
punishments  for  small  crimes  were  involved.  So  the  question  is  largely  about  the 
frequency of major crimes.  
In assessing the opportunities to experiment with false accusations, other aspects 
of the overall social norm are likely to be important. That is, after claiming you are a 
witness to a major crime, making the same claim a second time is likely to be met with 
some skepticism. This is certainly true in modern times, where, for example, a record of 
past  accusations  is  generally  viewed  as  reasons  to  treat  current  accusations  with 
skepticism. Someone who constantly finds a severed human finger in her bowl of chili is 
not  likely  to  be  believed.  This  highlights  the  essential  feature  of  our  model:  the 
endogeneity  of  frequency  of  play.  As  long  as  once  a  witness  has  appeared  they  are 
unlikely  to  choose  to  do  so  again,  their  incentive  to  acquire  information  about  the 
consequences of false accusations is diminished regardless of why they are unlikely to 
play again. 
 
¨  Other Sources of Experiments 
In  practice,  there  may  be  other  sources  of  experimentation  in  addition  to  the 
rational  learning  that  is  the  focus  of  this  paper.  For  example,  we  can  introduce  an 
exogenous probability that crime does pay. Most work on learning in  extensive-form 
games, including the work discussed in the conclusion, has treated the frequency and 
timing of off-path “experiments” as exogenous; introducing random payoff shocks that 
serve as a source of “experimentation” has the same consequence.  The robust conclusion 
of this work is that if every node is reached a positive fraction of the time, then the limit 
equilibrium must necessarily be subgame perfect, so that superstition cannot persist; such 
a theory obviously cannot be used as an explanation of the Code of Hammurabi.  
At the same time, one potentially troubling aspect of our model is that in the limit 
of arbitrarily long lifetimes our model predicts that there will be no crimes at all, yet   30 
almost certainly in the time of Hammurabi there were both crimes and false accusations. 
In this context, it is important to realize that it is the steady states for long but finite 
lifetimes that are intended to reflect reality and not the limit steady state itself. In the 
steady states with finite lifetimes, crimes are committed, false accusations take place, and 
indeed some individuals learn that making false accusations is a good idea.  What is true 
is  that  in  the  limit  all  these  things  disappear,  so  that  what  matters  is  the  relative 
probabilities of the exogenous and endogenous experiments. 
The details of the proof of our main theorem provide additional information about 
the robustness of our results to the presence of other sources of noise. It is useful to 
distinguish  between  primary  experimentation,  meaning  experimentation  on  the 
equilibrium path, and secondary experimentation, which takes place at nodes that are not. 
The former we measured by  ￿ ￿ , the latter by  ￿ ￿ . In the Hammurabi game, the former 
corresponds to experimentation with crimes; the latter corresponds to experimentation 
with false accusations. 
Our  results  show  that  with  patient  players  superstitions  one  step  off  the  path 
cannot persist – and of course introducing additional noise only reinforces this conclusion 
–  so  the  question  is  whether  there  is  enough  secondary  experimentation  to  eliminate 
superstition. However, primary experimentation plays a role, because it determines the 
frequency  with  which  secondary  experimentation  is  possible,  and  increased  primary 
experimentation  increases  the  incentive  to  conduct  secondary  experimentation,  as  in 
Lemma A.5.  
The proof of Theorem 6.1 shows that if  ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿  are bounded by small positive 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  respectively, then rational learning induces sufficiently little experimentation that 
these bounds are preserved for large ￿  by the mapping  ￿ ￿  defining the steady state.  An 
implication of this line of proof is that other sources of noise that do not cause   ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿  
to become too large will not upset the equilibrium.  
With respect to primary experimentation  ￿ ￿ , the  bound  ￿ ￿  that the proof requires  
decreases to zero as the discount factor goes to one. This is again an implication of the 
proof of Lemma A.5. If there is a fixed exogenous probability of crimes being committed 
and the discount factor goes to one, the superstition will unravel. But for any particular 
discount factor, the proof shows there is a threshold  ￿ ￿  so that if the probability of crime   31 
￿ ￿  remains below it, not enough secondary experimentation is triggered to upset the 
equilibrium. 
Turning more specifically to the Hammurabi game, if the exogenous probability 
of crime is sufficiently low, then the probability of being called as a witness is also small, 
and the incentive to experiment with false accusations is small. Certainly in the modern 
day, the probability of being called as a witness at a trial is exceptionally small; most 
people are not called even once in a lifetime.  
In summary, if opportunities to make accusations are limited, either endogenously 
or exogenously, superstitions about the consequences of play are liable to last a long 
time.  If  a  lot  of  experimentation  takes  place  with  false  accusations,  or  if  many 
opportunities arise to make false accusations, then it would be surprising if a superstition 
about the consequences of false accusations would in fact survive. 
 
¨  Model Details 
There are a number of dimensions in which our “Hammurabi game” simplifies the 
Code; many realistic details can be added to the game without changing the mathematical 
results. First is the endogeneity of appeals: we could have smaller and greater crimes, 
with the incentive to appeal dependent on the size of the crime, and explicitly introduce 
the fact that by  appealing the stakes are raised by the loss of house  along with life. 
Naturally  if  an  appeal  is  unlikely  to  take  place  then  the  incentive  to  make  a  false 
accusation is greatly increased. But in this case no information about the probability of 
drowning in the river following a false accusation is generated, and so the analysis does 
not change. 
  Similarly, it is likely in many cases the witness might prefer to testify truthfully 
rather than making a false accusation against an enemy. This simply adds a branch to the 
tree that is not relevant to our analysis. Or there might be a third option for the witness, 
“do not testify.” Provided that the witness suffers a loss from having the true criminal 
escape sufficient to compensate for the cost of mistakenly being punished when telling 
the truth, the addition of such an option does not change our analysis.   32 
9. Conclusion 
We have shown that a patiently stable state must be path-equivalent to a Nash  
equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, and that in games with no own ties, a 
subgame-confirmed  equilibrium  is  path  equivalent  to  a  patiently  stable  state  if  the 
equilibrium is near pure or if the game has length at most three.  These results lead to 
sharp predictions in some games of interest, such as the Hammurabi, ultimatum, best- 
shot, peasant-dictator, and trust games.  
We are working on an extension of our analysis to the more general class of 
“games  with  identified  deviators.”  We  conjecture  that  in  these  games  only  subgame-
confirmed equilibria can be patiently stable. However, the result that every subgame-
confirmed  equilibrium  is  equivalent  to  a  patiently  stable  state  seems  unlikely  to 
generalize, which leaves open the question of determining a more restrictive necessary 
condition. 
 Nash  equilibrium  is  “as  if”  players  know  the  equilibrium  path  and  the 
consequences of unilateral deviations from the equilibrium path. This is why learning in 
an extensive form need not in general lead to Nash equilibrium: to rule out non-Nash 
profiles,  players  must  have  “enough”  observations  of  off-path  play  to  learn  the 
consequences of deviating. Equilibrium refinements such as subgame-perfect equilibrium 
are “as if” players know play throughout the entire game tree.  This requires  “enough” 
observations of play at most information sets, not just those that can be reached by a 
single deviation.  Thus the two key issues for learning in extensive form games are (1) 
How much off-path play is needed for various refinements, and (2) How much off-path 
play should we expect to see? Much work, such as Fudenberg and Kreps [1988], [1995], 
[1996], Jehiel and Samet [2004], Noldeke and Samuelson [1993] and Hart [2002] has 
treated the amount of off-path play as being determined by exogenous experimentation 
rates.  Fudenberg and Kreps worked with a model of boundedly rational learning in the 
style of fictitious play, and developed various assumptions that ensured that every node 
one step off the path of play is reached infinitely often, such as the condition that at each 
date t, each player is constrained to play each action (at the information sets that are 
reached) with probability at least  ￿￿ ￿ . They point out that this condition implies that 
nodes on the path are reached infinitely often, while nodes that are two or more steps off 
of the path may only be reached finitely many times; they are agnostic about whether one   33 
should expect more or less experimentation than this at off-path information sets.
24 In 
their  work  on  the  convergence  of  boundedly  rational  learning  in  games  of  perfect 
information,  Jehiel  and  Samet  [2004]  assume  that  there  is  a  fixed,  time-invariant 
probability of experimentation; this implies that every node is reached a positive fraction 
of the time.
25  In Noldeke and Samuelson [1993] and Hart [2002], off-path play occurs as 
the result of an exogenous “mutation” that leads an agent to use another strategy; this 
serves as an “experiment” from the viewpoint of the population because all agents get to 
observe the result of the mutants play.   
The present paper, like our [1993b] work, differs in deriving the experimentation 
rule from the solution to the agent’s optimal decision. It is clear that impatient agents 
need not experiment at all, so we have focused on the play of very patient agents. The 
main force driving our results is that even patient agents need not experiment at nodes 
that are off of the path of play; this is why all subgame-confirmed equilibria are patiently 
stable.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 If on-path players experiment at rate  ￿￿ ￿ , a player at a node that is one step off of  the path needs to 
experiment at a higher rate to make sure that he uses all actions infinitely often; our results show that a 
rational player would not chose to experiment that much. 
25 They also impose independent beliefs, and look at maximization in the agent normal form. For this 
reason, the steady states of their model correspond to Selten’s [1975]  ￿ trembling hand perfection in the 
agent normal form; they show that the learning process they consider converges to this outcome in games 
of perfect information.   34 
Appendix A: Proofs 
Let { } n x  be a sequence of i.i.d. binomial random variables with mean ￿, and define  
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Proof: We derive specific bounds based on the method of proof of the strong law of large 
numbers given by Billingsley [1995], p. 85. By Markov’s inequality, 
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By collecting terms and using known inequalities, Billingsley shows 
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and in the binomial case  ￿ ￿ ￿
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that  
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Finally, to estimate the sum, when  ￿ ￿ ￿  it is equal to  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  where z  is the 
Riemann zeta function. For  ￿ ￿ ￿  we have the bound  
                                                 
26  The Lemma is stated for the case of binomial random variables, where its strength is proportional to the 
mean  ￿ , but it is true more generally. The key requirement for this “strong law of small numbers” is that 
the variance of the ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be near 0.   35 
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which gives the desired result. 
￿ 
Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . Define  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be the frequency with which ￿  has been played when 
￿  has been reached. Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the behavior strategy profile corresponding to  ￿ ￿  
according to Kuhn’s Theorem, and let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  be the marginal probability of reaching 
x derived from  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  given an  ￿ ￿  such that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the number of 
times ￿  has been hit given the sample  ￿ ￿ , and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the number of times  ￿ ￿  has 
been played.  
 
 
Lemma  A.2  For  all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   there  is  an  0 N >   for  all 
, , , , ( ), , ( ), , i i j T r i a A x s x X s x X j i q Î Î Î ¹  
(A.2.1)   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
(A.2.2)   " # ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
References: Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] Lemma B.2. The first statement says that 
fewer than  ￿ ￿  of the population have both a large number  N of observations at some 
node x  and also a biased sample of  play at that node.  The second statement says that 
fewer than  ￿ ￿  of the population have played a strategy  ￿ ￿ that makes x  reachable more 
than N times and yet have reached node x  appreciably less often than the theoretical 
probability.  Both  of  these  statements  are  consequences  of  the  strong  law  of  large 
numbers,  and  more  specifically  the  Glivenko-Cantelli  theorem,  which  shows  that  the 
empirical distribution at each information set converges to the theoretical distribution as 
the sample size increases at a rate that holds uniformly over all theoretical distributions, 
i.e. over all possible values of ￿ .  (The reason this lemma needs a proof is to show that 
the  bound  also  hold  over  all  strategies  ￿ ￿ ,  which  corresponds  to  it  holding  over  all 
sampling rules. ) 
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Let 
T
i r  be optimal rules when life is ￿  periods, and let  ￿
￿ ￿  be optimal rules when  ￿  
periods of life remain. The next lemma says that if the population fraction playing a 
strategy is strictly positive in the limit as ￿ ￿ ￿, then population fraction that has 
played it  N  times  can’t be much less that the population fraction. This is simply a matter 
of bookkeeping, and not related to probability theory.  
 
Lemma A.3:   If  ( ) i i s q >0, then 
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Reference: Fudenberg and Levine  [1993b] Lemma 5.7.  
 
We define the event  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  to be those  ￿ ￿  such that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
That is,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the set of histories for player i such that  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is an ￿-best-response to 
the marginal belief at  ￿ ￿ . 
Lemma A.4: For all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿  there is an ￿  such that for all  ￿￿ ￿  such that 
  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ . 
Reference: Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] proof of Theorem 6.1. The intuition for this 
result  is  that  if  an  agent  has  many  observations  of  play  at  node  x,    then  one  more 
observation is not likely to change the posterior beliefs by very much, so that the “option” 
or “information”  value” of experimenting at this node is likely to be low. Consequently,  
an optimal rule must prescribe an e -best response with high probability.
27 Thus, only a 
few players can be playing an action  ( )
k
i i i a r y =  that they have already played more than 
N times and which is not an ￿-best-response to their beliefs. 
Lemma A.5 : If  priors are independent in the sense that  
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27  In the classical one-armed bandit problem, the agent stops experimenting in finite time so one might 
expect that we could take  ' e  to be 0 by taking N sufficiently large. However, as we explained in our earlier 
work, the fact that players know the structure of the game tree means that in some games there can be large 
but “unrepresentative” samples for which the value of further experimenting is still high.  We conjecture 
that these samples cannot occur in simple games, so that we could indeed set  ' 0 e =  for the purposes of this 
paper, but it is easier to appeal to the more general result.    37 
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Proof:  Set  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  By  assumption  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   yields 
information that will only be of value only if x is reached again. The greatest value the 
information could have at that time is ￿ . Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  where  ￿ ￿ ￿  means that x was 
not reached during the previous ￿  periods. Then   
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where the second inequality follows from the facts that  ￿ ￿  is non-increasing in t, and that  
increasing the probability  ￿ ￿  of stopping in period t  decreases the expected waiting time 
and so increases the expected present value. 
Note  that  only  ￿ ￿   is  relevant;  the  strength  of  the  belief  is  not.  Also 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which gives the result. 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 
Appendix B: The Four Player Centipede Game 
  Each of four players may either drop out, or pass the move to the next player, 
with payoffs shown in the diagram below. The bold lines indicate the subgame-confirmed 
equilibrium we propose to study.  Here players 1, 2, and 4 are playing the best response 
to the actual distribution of opponent’s  play.  Some player 3’s drop and some pass, even 
though the payoff to pass is strictly higher; this is consistent with the definition because 
self-confirming equilibrium allows player  ￿ to rationalize each  ￿ ￿  in the support of  ￿ ￿  
with a different belief.      38 
We claim first that in a subgame-confirmed equilibrium in which player 1 drops 
out, player 2 must pass with positive probability, and that player 3 must randomize. To 
see  this,  note  first  that  player  2  must  pass  with  positive  probability  in  any  Nash 
equilibrium  where  1  drops,  so  the  same  is  true  for  the  more  restrictive  concept  of  
subgame-confirmed  equilibrium.  Now  consider  the  subgame  starting  with  player  2’s 
move. If 2 plays pass with positive probability  in a self-confirming equilibrium, then 2’s 
payoff to pass  must be at least 5, so 3 must pass  with probability at least .25  However, 
it is not consistent with subgame-confirmed equilibrium for player 1 to drop, player 2 to 
pass with positive probability,  and player 3 to pass with probability 1, as then player 1 
would  get  more  than  4  from  pass,  regardless  of  2’s  randomization  probabilities,  and 
moreover player 1 would know this, because all nodes would be at most one step off of 
the equilibrium path. 
We claim next that the equilibrium above, in which player 1 drops, is not path 
equivalent to an equilibrium with Nash play at all nodes at most one step off of the path 
of play. To show this, consider the Nash equilibria of the subgame starting with player 
2’s move. If 2 drops with probability 1, then player 1 would pass, so player 2 must pass 
with positive probability for player 1 to drop.  If 2 passes with positive probability, then 
Nash equilibrium requires optimal play by player 3. If player 3 drops with probability 1, 
then  2  would  not  be  willing  to  pass,  so  3  must  pass    with  positive  probability;  this 
1
2
3
4
drop (4,2,1,2)
(7,5,3,5)
(0,4,5,4)
(2,3,4,3)
(6,8,6,8)
drop
drop
drop
pass
pass
pass
pass (50%)
(50%)  39 
requires that 4 play optimally and pass, so that 3 strictly prefers to pass,  and then 2 
strictly prefers to pass as well. But when players 2, 3, and 4 all pass with probability 1, 
player 1 prefers pass to drop. 
 The heart of this example is that there is a conflict between player 1’s and player 
2’s  incentive  constraints,  so  that  for  them  both  to  play  as  specified,  player  3  must 
randomize. Yet in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting with 2’s move, if player 2  
passes and player 3 randomizes, player 4 must pass,  so 3 must pass  with probability 1.
28 
 
                                                 
28 Thus the self-confirming equilibrium in the subgame beginning with player 2’s move in which player 3 
randomizes is a counterexample to a claim made in Fudenberg and Levine [1997] that in games of perfect 
information  self-confirming  equilibria  are  public  randomizations  over  Nash  equilibrium.  It  is  true  for 
games where no path through the tree hits more than two information sets, as we prove in the process of 
proving  Lemma 6.4.   40 
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